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ABSTRACT
This article presents the historical and political trajectory of
Kitchanga town in North Kivu, to demonstrate how current
processes of urbanization in a context of civil war in Eastern
Congo are strongly intertwined with regional politics of refuge.
Kitchanga, an urban agglomeration that emerged from the
gradual urbanization of IDP and refugee concentrations, has
occupied very different positions through different episodes of
the wars, ranging from a safe haven of refuge, to a rebel
headquarter, to a violent battleground. On the basis of a historical
account of Kitchanga’s development, the paper argues for a
spatial reading of broader geographies of war, displacement and
ethnic mobilization in North Kivu. It shows that these urban
agglomerations as ‘places’ and their urbanization as ‘processes’
are crucial to better understand the spatial politics of refuge in
North Kivu. The article builds on original empirical data.
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On 6 March 2010, part of the population of Kitchanga, an agglomeration located in the
North Kivu province of the D.R. Congo, took the streets to demand the ‘urban status’
(‘le statut d’une ville’) for their town.1 The hundreds of people demonstrating based
their demand on the fact that Kitchanga had doubled in demographic size in less than
five years’ time. What was in the early 1990s a small village with limited economic (or pol-
itical) significance developed during the civil wars into a town with population figures esti-
mated around 80,000.2 It stands in sharp contrast with its rural surroundings as a result of
its relatively developed infrastructure, commerce, and economic markets. The case of
Kitchanga is symptomatic of an important tendency observed in the whole of the
Eastern Congo. A remarkable outcome of protracted violent conflict is a steady rural-
urban transformation of the densely populated Kivu provinces. Kitchanga’s expansion
is a direct outcome of dynamics of conflict and conflict-related (forced) mobility. Since
the start of the Congolese civil war in the early 1990’s (see below), immigration and
internal displacement have been central to the town’s development. Its social-demo-
graphic composition, its economic profile and its political dynamics are strongly influ-
enced by its position as a ‘safe haven’. Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs)
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settled both in the centre as well as in its peripheral IDP camps, becoming main drivers of
the town’s expansion and transformation.
Kitchanga is just one example of emerging ‘boomtowns’ that characterize Eastern
Congo at present; other examples of war-induced urbanization are Hombo (Kalehe,
South Kivu), Faraje (Haute-Uele), Rubaya (Masisi, North Kivu) and Nyabibwe (Kalehe,
South Kivu). Like Kitchanga, some of these towns also claim the ‘urban status’ of their
agglomeration based on demographic size, as population numbers is one of the criteria
in the 2008 ‘decentralization law’ to be eligible to become a commune.3 However, in the
Kivu provinces, characterized by fierce military struggles for political representation
and territorial control, this claim is often politically inspired. In Kitchanga’s case, for
example, the march claiming the city status was perceived as ‘ethnically’ engineered
(see below).
We argue that the emergence and urbanization of Kitchanga is a process that is as much
about politics as it is about spatial patterns of (forced) mobility, settlement and expansion.
The case of Kitchanga shows that those agglomerations as ‘places’ and their urbanization
as ‘processes’ play an important role in the spatial politics of displacement and migration
in North Kivu. A historical analysis shows how Kitchanga’s growth and urbanization have
been shaped by these politics. Politicians, other elites or armed groups have used the pres-
ence, mobility and settlement of refugees and IDPs in and around Kitchanga for political
mobilization. Consequently, the urbanization of Kitchanga has been the outcome of the
agency of very different actors. The focus on a single case allows for a spatial reading of
broader geographies of war, displacement and ethnic mobilization in North Kivu, in
which urban agglomerations like Kitchanga represent spatial nodes of protection, military
mobilization and political ambitions.
From a historical account of its development between the 1990s and 2016, this article
elaborates on different ‘episodes’ in Kitchanga’s urbanization trajectory: from a safe haven,
to a rebel quarter, to a violent battleground, to a contested ‘city’. Each episode represents
spatial ‘windows’ to study the contested, politicized and militarized presence and perma-
nent settlement of refugees and IDPs. This case contributes to academic debates on the
urban dimensions of ‘refuge’4 and forced displacement in Africa. More specifically, it cri-
tically engages with the concept of the ‘camp city’5 and questions the notion of the ‘acci-
dental city’6 by highlighting the political dimension of Kitchanga’s growth and
urbanization. With its highly mobile population, large numbers of IDPs, a long history
of transborder migration and a political mobilization of ‘autochthony’ discourses, North
Kivu province offers a particularly interesting research setting. Kitchanga’s case demon-
strates that urban centres in rural areas serve in several ways as important locations
from which to study the spatial politics of mobility, of presence and of return in a
context of violent conflict.
The article starts with a theoretical part addressing the relevant academic debates and
introducing the conceptual framework, followed by an introduction of the case, zooming
in on the urbanization process of a ‘camp-city’. Our analysis is structured around different
moments and elements of urban expansion as part of broader politics of forced displace-
ment: Kitchanga becoming a site of protection, a rebel stronghold, a battlefield, and finally
a ‘contested city’. The article builds on empirical data; on the one hand it is informed by
more than eight years of ethnographic and historical research experience on dynamics of
violent conflict, urbanization and mobility in the North Kivu region, on the other hand it
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uses data from semi-structured interviews with several stakeholders collected in and
around Kitchanga town during February-March 2015 and May 2016 with the indispensa-
ble help of several researchers.
Between war, camp and city: urban dimensions of violent conflict, forced
displacement and refuge
A growing body of literature on wartime mobility in the Great Lakes and the broader con-
flict affected East African region investigates the urban dynamics of protracted displace-
ment or refuge. On the one hand, there has been a particular interest in the urban
integration process (social, economic and political) of refugees and IDPs who ‘settle’ in
urban areas. Examples are case-studies of Nairobi, Kampala, Juba, Karthoum, Gulu and
Dar es Salaam.7 For the DRC, a number of studies have focused on the relationship
between forced displacement and urbanization. The IDP crisis in the Kivu region that
resulted from different waves of violence has an important urban element. The majority
of people who were forced by violence to flee stay outside of IDP camps with ‘host com-
munities’.8 In their search for security, people tend to flee to those locations that present a
minimal connection to state security services and infrastructure.9 Besides presenting
spatial entities of protection,10 urbanized environments in the Kivu provinces are also
attractive because of livelihood opportunities.11 Some studies analyzed the emergence of
urban ‘IDP economies’ in Eastern Congo12, or the living conditions of urban IDPs in
Goma and Bukavu.13 It has for example been well documented how the urban settlement
of internally displaced people has shaped and transformed the urbanization process in
Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu.14
On the other hand, researchers have studied the urbanization process of (protracted)
camp-settlements in Africa. Two well-known case studies in this regard are Kakuma
and Dadaab, Kenyan refugee camps with histories that go back to the early 1990s.
Agier has called these urbanized camps ‘naked cities’ and Jansen used the concept of ‘acci-
dental city’ to analyze the spatial and socio-economic transformation of refugee concen-
trations into permanent cityscapes with urbanized infrastructure, markets, livelihoods and
identities.15 The urbanity of camps has been a topic elaborated upon by several other aca-
demics outside the African context to interrogate the spatality of refuge.16 According to
Agier, emphasizing the importance of an urban anthropology of refugee camps, the
‘city-camp’ (or ‘camp-city’) represents a ‘novel socio-spatial form between war and city’
in which people stay not only because of the continuation of violence preventing them
from returning ‘home’, but also because of the urban characteristics of the place.17 The
protractedness of human concentration, the infrastructural capacities, and the function
of these camp-cities as trading hubs and labour markets, further define their urban char-
acter.18 The notion of camp-cities points at the spatial translations of an often strained
cohabitation of urbanization and forced displacement. For the DRC, there has been no
particular literature dealing with the urbanization process of spaces of refuge. Yet, this
concept of ‘camp-cities’, as further elaborated by for example Branch,19 can be useful to
analyze emerging urbanities in eastern Congo, as our case of Kitchanga will demonstrate.
The concept of the ‘accidental city’, the outcome of an unforeseen, un-planned urban-
ization of a place never intended to become permanent, also seems useful to understand
Kitchanga’s evolution; a town that has developed from a concentration of refugees and
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IDPs. Yet, upon closer inspection and analysis of Kitchanga’s historical trajectory, the
very notion of its emergence and urbanization as ‘accidental’ is challenged. Looking
more carefully at how Kitchanga became an urban agglomeration reveals the highly pol-
itical nature of this urbanization process. When authors like Jansen or Agier mention poli-
tics in their work, this is often restricted to framing the accidental city or the ‘camp-city’ as
a ‘distinctive political space’, in which politics are formed by a humanitarian regime.20 In
his analysis of the accidental city, Jansen presents the dynamic social processes of place-
making by different actors (refugees, humanitarians, former rebels) that turn the camp
eventually into a city. The case of Kitchanga adds an extra political dimension to these pro-
cesses of place-making and urbanization, not only from actors within but also actors
outside the settlement. Darling and Saynal have argued that to unpack the urban character
of refuge, the political should be put in the centre of the discussion.21 By doing so in ana-
lysing Kitchanga’s development, the camp-city and its urbanization process emerge as a
political rather than an accidental project. We use insights from Darling’s work to
analyze the mobilizing potential of the urban in broader political geographies of
refuge.22 The political mobilization of urban spatialities of refuge, visible for example in
the politics of presence, clearly reflect the important place of ‘cities of refuge’ like Kitch-
anga in the broader military and identity politics of forced displacement and migration in
North Kivu.
We argue in this article that both the town of Kitchanga in itself (as a political space) as
well as its urbanization (as a political process) has been part of militarized identity politics.
While the initial phases of Kitchanga’s development might have been triggered by an ‘acci-
dental’ permanent settlement of people seeking refuge, under the influence of elites, armed
groups and politicians, its ‘consolidation’ into a permanent town was an outcome of its
strategic function within the politics of refuge, presence and return. With these ‘politics
of refuge, presence and return’, we refer to dynamics of the (im-)mobility of populations
for political agendas, the political use of historical narratives on forced displacement or the
political manipulation of the relations between identity and territory. These different
dynamics have been studied in the DRC, revealing the mobilization of historical narratives
by armed groups, politicians and other elites for political or economic gains.23 Kitchanga,
just like the camp-cities described by Jansen or de Montclos, is the arena of entangled
agency of several actors, including IDPs and refugees, rebel leaders, big men and poli-
ticians.24 While humanitarian actors also play an important role, they are not particularly
addressed in this article.
Kitchanga, a camp-city: the ambiguities of the urbanization of refuge
Kitchanga is located in the hills of North Kivu overlooking Lake Kivu. The town stretches
across the border of Masisi and Rutshuru Territories. On the ground however, this admin-
istrative division is physically almost impossible to discern, and Kitchanga presents itself
as one agglomeration. The Masisi part of Kitchanga is the current – but not historical –
seat of the customary authorities of the Hunde Bashali royal family. While people with
diverse ethnic backgrounds are present in this part of Kitchanga – primarily Nyanga,
Tembo, and Nande – it is one of the largest settlements with a Hunde majority in
Masisi. On the side of Rutshuru, Kitchanga’s population consists mainly of Hutu and
Tutsi although Hunde and other ethnic groups are also present.
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Over the past 20 years, the town has experienced a fast demographic expansion and
today Kitchanga stands out from its rural surroundings with a demographic and spatial
extension that is much bigger than surrounding centres. Other ‘urban’ characteristics
further differentiate Kitchanga from its environment, reflecting the material forms of
city-camps in general, as they have been described in detail by for example Agier and
de Montclos.25 The nature of the housing infrastructure (besides wooden houses also
houses of brick, and multi-story houses), the presence of roads, public services and a diver-
sified local economy with several commercial and service activities, all add to the fact that
Kitchanga is referred to as a town, both by its inhabitants as well as by outsiders. As argued
by Jansen, these diversified entrepreneurial activities and services give these places the
‘cosmopolitan appearance’ that distinguishes them from their rural surroundings.26
In 2015, official available population figures for Kitchanga were 18,927 for the part
located in Masisi, and 25,157 for the side located in Rutshuru, without counting the popu-
lation in the IDP sites of Kahe and Mungote bordering Kitchanga. In Rutshuru Territory,
the Kahe site harboured 5760 IDPs and some refugees coming from Rwanda; theMungote
site in Masisi housed 14,599 people in 2015.27 Probably the real population figures
(excluding the IDP sites) were higher, and closer to 80,000.28 As is the case elsewhere
in the Kivu provinces, these demographic statistics form an important basis to claim its
‘urban’ status, as population numbers are one of the most important legal criteria to
elevate a locality into a commune or a ville even if these decisions are in many cases pol-
itically motivated (see below).29
Apart from its demographic composition, a number of Kitchanga’s spatial and socio-
economic characteristics reflect the fact that the town grew out of the protracted presence
of refugees and internally displaced people. The Mungote site emerged during 2007–2009
at the height of the clashes between the CNDP rebel movement (Congrès National pour la
Défence du Peuple, see below), the Congolese army, and other armed groups.30 Its popu-
lation mainly consists of Hutu mixed with some Tutsi. Whilst the site of Kahe was recog-
nized officially during that same period (January 2008), it housed Congolese returnees
from refugee camps in Rwanda already from 2002 onwards. The Kahe camp site’s popu-
lation is until today predominantly Tutsi. For both camps the largest part of the popu-
lation originates from the immediate vicinity of Kitchanga and whilst most of them
have been displaced as a result of the ongoing conflict, a considerable amount consists
of the former plantation labour (anciens ouvriers) that have been chased from the
former tea plantations (see below).31
As elsewhere in situations of protracted displacement in eastern DRC, the relation
between IDPs and their ‘host area’, or the relation between displacement and local ‘empla-
cement’ is complex.32 In a 2015 survey, 39% of IDPs in Kahe and 28% in Mungote indi-
cated that they wanted to integrate locally.33 Numbers among those IDPs staying with host
families might well be higher. While many displaced in the camps cite ‘insecurity’ or ‘con-
flicts over land’ as reasons not to return to their locality of origin, others as well admitted
staying because ‘life in Kitchanga offers more opportunities’,34 a reality which is a thriving
force beyond the urbanization of camp-cities in general.
Camp-city development did not only lead to the growth of Kitchanga town, the IDP
camps themselves increasingly ‘urbanized’ as temporary infrastructures transformed
into more permanent settlements, services and markets developed etc. Through the pro-
cesses of ‘urban integration’ and ‘place making’ (described by de Montclos and Jansen)
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expressing people’s connection and long-term engagement to the place, camp-cities trans-
form from temporary to permanent settlements.35 At present, several IDPs are in the
process of buying plots of land in the town as well as within the IDP camps. Even
people referred to as ‘autochthonous’ by those living in the camps, are buying plots in
the camps.36 Those who built a semi-permanent construction within the camp (house
in wood), are those who have bought a plot. There seems to be active encouragement
by private landowners of the campsites to make IDPs buy land. IDPs from the
Mungote site indicated they had been approached by the landowners in this regard.37
This indicates how the process of place-making in Kitchanga and becoming a ‘permanent’
agglomeration is not entirely ‘accidental’: it is not only shaped by IDPs’ livelihood strat-
egies but by elites as well. With parcelled land being more expensive then agricultural
land, Kitchanga’s growth has led to the commercialization of land. We observe similar
dynamics in other urbanizing areas in Eastern Congo. The Mugunga urban neighbour-
hood of the city of Goma originally was an IDP camp which gradually urbanized and
became part of the urban agglomeration.38
The permanent settlement of IDPs is not the only ‘urbanizing’ effect of forced displace-
ment in Kitchanga. As we observe in similar cases, population concentrations, and the
development of a humanitarian industry offered an investment opportunity for all
kinds of commercial and service activities (retail shops, catering, hotel- and restaurant
facilities, pharmacies, etc.) resulting in a relatively diversified local economy. It has been
demonstrated how the ‘emerging urbanity’ in camp-cities is strongly connected to their
concentration of infrastructure, economic activities and diversification of livelihoods.39
Many IDPs cite commercial opportunities that can complement or replace agricultural
activities as reasons to stay in Kitchanga. The humanitarian economy (by which IDPs
were given cash instead of goods) also reinforced capital circulation and commercial trans-
actions in town. As can be observed in camp-cities in general, humanitarian assistance in
the IDP camps is however sometimes also a source of tension.
We easily see the difference between the IDP camps, Kahe and Mungote camp where they
give food and humanitarian assistance and these camps are occupied essentially by Hutu
and Tutsi whilst the other communities, the Hunde, have problems and they are never
helped, it is the case of 27 March 2012 (sic.) Kitchanga has been burned down but everybody
has struggled on their own to reconstruct their houses.40
This statement expresses the existing tensions between IDPs and the ‘host’ or ‘autochtho-
nous’ communities, even if the population density in ‘town’ (or cité) is also partly the
outcome of earlier dynamics of forced displacement. The presence of the camps, as demo-
graphic concentrations of Kinyarwanda-speakers (both Hutu and Tutsi), is a much-con-
tested issue in Kitchanga.41 These Kinyarwanda-speakers are often well aware of this
problematic cohabitation with the Hunde community. As one IDP of Mungote camp
expressed:
The relations with [the autochthonous] are not good. Our Hunde friends want the IDP
camps to be destroyed as soon as possible. (…) There are people that want to return but
under the condition that peace is restored where they came from. A part wants to stay
here. Especially me, I already have a plot in Kitchanga, I do not want to return, here it is
better for me. Those who have commercial or agricultural activities in Kitchanga that are suc-
cessful will not want to return either. The only obstacle we are confronted with is the
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cohabitation with our Hunde brothers that is still very fragile and might even end up in other
ethnic wars if we do not accept each other mutually.42
In the wake of security incidents, these tensions can become very palpable. In February
2015 for example, after three people of the Hunde community had been killed during a
wake, tensions between the population of Kitchanga cité and Mungote camp erupted as
it was rumoured that the assailants came from the camp.43 According to the Mungote
camp authorities, in the aftermath of these killings, rumours circulated about plans to
burn down the camp.44 While this cannot be conﬁrmed, members of the Hunde commu-
nity wanted to demonstrate against these murders, but had to be calmed down by the
mwami45 and the police.46 After these incidents, the Mungote camp was raided by the
police and searched for weapons.
Rumours about weapon stocks within the camps are no exception, as are allegations
that members of armed groups have found refuge in the camps.47 For people in the
cité, Kitchanga’s camps are sometimes conceptualized as sources of insecurity, especially
because they escape the control of local authorities:
The camps are politicized. […] The camps are not controlled by the local authorities, they do
not have the same power. Moreover we know that the camps destabilize this place (ce milieu).
The authorities do not have a grip on the camp. The administration of the camps does not
depend on them [local authorities]. They are free. The camps are occupied by one ethnic
group. They are free to do what they want in the camps.48
Historical layers of Kitchanga’s ethnic tensions: the politics of autochthony
The events described above illustrate the ambiguous capacity of camp-cities; on the one
hand they embody safety and protection, on the other hand they embody a perceived
potential for insecurity and violence.49 Yet, the politicization of forced displacement
goes far beyond the recent history of the Kahe and Mungote IDP camps. The emergence
of Kitchanga as a site of political contestation between Hunde and Kinyarwanda-speakers
is the result of historical patterns of migration and displacement in North Kivu.
During the nineteenth century, the majority of people in the highlands of Masisi where
Kitchanga is located were Hunde, organized in small Hunde polities. The part of Kitch-
anga nowadays located in Masisi was ruled by the Bashali royal family. The Masisi high-
lands were ecologically perfectly suitable for plantations. Yet, to make them profitable for
the European settler economy, they needed labour. Thus, from 1937 onwards, the Belgian
administration planned and organized a migratory movement towards Masisi consisting
of labour coming from neighbouring Rwanda.50 These ‘Banyarwanda’51 (Hutu and Tutsi)
settled at first predominantly in the Gishari chieftaincy, a chieftaincy erected by the colo-
nial authorities on land that had been taken from the Hunde. It was administered by a
Rwandan chief who had accompanied these labour migrants.52 Others settled on land
in what is nowadays the Bashali chieftaincy under the control of Hunde chiefs, and
often also directly on the plantations where they worked.53
Over 100,000 Banyarwanda settled in North Kivu during the colonial period.54 Today,
the descendants of these people are locally sometimes called les immigrés or transplantés.
Their Rwandan background had important ramifications on identity politics, as today they
are locally framed as ‘non-autochthonous’.55 In this article, when speaking of the post-
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colonial period, we use the term Kinyarwanda-speakers or Rwandophones for this group,
although many other Kinyarwanda-speakers were present in Congo before its political
borders were traced.56
Seeds of labelling these Hutu and Tutsi immigrants as non-autochthonous seem to have
sprouted from the Belgian’s minds. In 1954 already the Belgians talked about protecting
the ‘indigenous authorities’. Furthermore, they started to fear what they called
‘Rwandan irredentism’, and called into question their earlier decision to organize these
Banyarwanda in an independent chieftaincy.57 Partly as a result of these problems, the
Gishari chieftaincy was abolished by the Belgian administration in 1957 and control
was given back to the Hunde customary authorities.58 This abolishment meant that
Banyarwanda in Masisi were in effect no longer represented by any customary authority.
As demonstrated in the final parts of this article, the absence of ‘customary’ representation
was (and is) an important motivator in the struggle for political representation of the
Kinyarwanda-speakers in Masisi.
Especially in Masisi, electoral competition and local struggles over resources, land and
public authority have often resulted in sharp divisions between on the one hand those
labelled as ‘autochthonous’ (status claimed by Hunde, Tembo, Nyanga) and the ‘Banyar-
wanda’, ‘Rwandophones’, or ‘Kinyarwanda-speakers’ (the Hutu and Tutsi communities).
They clashed for the first time between 1963 and 1965 in the wake of local elections during
what is called ‘the Kanyarwanda war’.59
At that time Kitchanga consisted mainly of people who had settled there in order to
work as labour on the colonial tea plantations.60 According to one inhabitant who
arrived in Kitchanga in 1961, ‘at that time the whole of Kitchanga was a forest, and we
could see wild animals in the midst of Kitchanga’.61
While Kitchanga became gradually more important in the years after independence, it
remained a small village with very few inhabitants, used by travellers between Goma and
the more important centres of Pinga, Mweso and Birambizo. It already had some commer-
cial importance as it was located on the junction of several roads used to transport for
example palm oil and beans to centres such as Goma and Butembo.62
It is only in the 1990s and at the onset of the First and the Second Congo wars that
Kitchanga became gradually more important. From this period onwards, different
phases of violence in North Kivu caused large scale population movements with hundreds
of thousands of people fleeing their homes seeking for protection. In this context of forced
displacement, Kitchanga increasingly evolved as a ‘zone of refuge’, attracting displaced
people from different ethnic backgrounds. These demographic shifts further influenced
historical antagonisms.
Kitchanga as ‘ville de réfuge’: a site of protection and mobilization
Logics of protection and politics of presence go a long way in explaining people’s move-
ment towards – and settlement patterns in – Kitchanga. These dynamics turned Kitchanga
into an important space for mobilization, often around notions of identity, and into a stra-
tegic place in elite’s struggles for power and control.
Between 1992 and 1994 localized conflict erupted in Masisi. Populations identifying
themselves as ‘autochthonous’ (Hunde, Nyanga, and Tembo) opposed those they labelled
as non-autochthonous (Rwandophones, and in this period mainly Hutu).63 Local ethnic
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militia were formed. While the immediate cause of this conflict were the local elections,
violent clashes of this era were also the result of the weakened state of Mobutu’s
regime. The latter used ‘autochthony’ as a fulcrum of ethnic politics, further fuelling
these tensions.64 These clashes lasted for six months, with as many as 10,000 casualties,
and at least 250,000 being displaced.65 Many Hunde, including mwami Sylvestre
Bashali, fled to Kitchanga during this period.66 His resettlement possibly explains why
so many displaced Hunde followed to Kitchanga.
After a tense period of ‘peace’ the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the influx of Rwandan
Hutu refugees into Congo dramatically shifted the political landscape of the eastern
Congo. At least 850,000 of these refugees were located in North Kivu, in the vicinity of
Goma and Sake.67 Congolese Hutu teamed up with the Hutu refugee leadership, elements
of FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises), and the Interahamwe, who were responsible for com-
mitting the genocide in Rwanda. The local antagonisms of the 1992–1994 era took on a
regional dimension as the interests of these radical Rwandan Hutu refugees collided
with those of the Congolese Hutu militia.68 The refugee camps in Congo were used to
launch attacks on Rwanda, and on Congolese soil Congolese Tutsi and ‘autochthonous’
populations were attacked by Hutu militias, causing further waves of displacement.69
The ensuing violence reinforced Kitchanga’s status as a ‘ville de réfuge’. As a result,
19,000 IDPs had gathered in Kitchanga in 1996, most of them Hunde. This made Kitch-
anga the largest single concentration of ‘autochthones’ in that part of Masisi.70 Given the
numerically weak position of Hunde in the whole of Masisi territory (Hutu have the
majority) this made Kitchanga an important site of ethnic mobilization. One possible
reason why the previously rather unimportant Kitchanga attracted many displaced
Hunde was the presence of a regiment of 30 DSP (Divison Spéciale Presidentielle) in
town. In their fight against the Hutu militias this regiment allied with the Hunde popu-
lation and their local militias.71
The large concentration of Hunde and IDPs, but also Hunde militia using Kitchanga as
a strategic base for attacks on surrounding villages, turned it into an important target for
local Hutu militias and Rwandan Hutu, who repeatedly attacked the locality.72 Hunde
were however not the only ones finding some form of refuge in Kitchanga. Almost all
Tutsi from Masisi and Rutshuru became displaced, the largest part of them finding them-
selves eventually in Rwanda.73 Tutsi were relatively safe in Kitchanga because of the strong
Hunde presence over Hutu, and, according to Scott, the local integration of Tutsi in the
region at that time.74 In May 1996 Kitchanga offered refuge to over 1000 Tutsi escaping
the massacre by Hutu forces in the nearby Mokoto monastery.75
The Rwandan refugee crisis on Congolese soil escalated and led to the ‘First Congo
War’, during which Laurent Kabila’s AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la
Libération du Zaire), supported by the Rwandan regime, overthrew Mobutu in May
1997.76 This AFDL-rebellion was perceived in North Kivu as Tutsi-dominated. It
offered already existing militias a new cause: that of an anti-Tutsi force fighting against
foreign occupation.77
The following year marked the start of the Second Congo War (1998–2003). Laurent
Kabila had a fall-out with his Rwandan allies and tried to expel them. During this war,
virtually the whole of eastern Congo came under the rule of the RCD rebel movement
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie). This movement was dominated by
Kinyarwanda-speakers (both Hutu and Tutsi) and backed by Rwanda and Uganda.
JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES 9
Kitchanga remained a site of refuge during the RCD era. As in other places under RCD
control, ‘customary’ authority was reshuffled.78 For example, the RCD replaced the
mwami of Bashali-Mokoto, mwami Bashali Nyanguba, by a crony of the RCD, a certain
Kapenda Muhima, son of a local Hunde notable.79 Rebel rule over Kitchanga led to
elite involvement aiming at putting local resources under control of (mainly) Congolese
Rwandophones. In and around Kitchanga, political and military elites linked to the
RCD acquired large land concessions, sometimes through dubious semi-legal means
and in some cases by violently ‘grabbing’ it to turn it into pasture land.
Most importantly, Kitchanga became an important site of Congolese Tutsi ‘returnees’
from Rwanda, and as such gained strategic importance in the RCD’s politics of return.
These Tutsi, who fled the DRC between 1994 and 1996 (see above), had returned in con-
secutive waves under RCD control, with the active (and sometimes forced) encouragement
of RCD elites.80 For Kitchanga, most of these returnees settled around 2002 in Kahe (see
above), on the land of a former tea plantation belonging to a RCD politician. This elite
involvement again indicates the political stakes in turning Kitchanga into a permanent
agglomeration.
The emergence of Kitchanga as a real ‘site of refuge’ thus began during the First and
Second Congo wars. At the same time, events during this period also carried the seeds
for future politicized and militarized struggles over Kitchanga.
A safe haven, for whom? From rebel-stronghold to battlefield
I was with you during the war of 92–93. […] I remember that at this time, Kitchanga was a
meeting place for everyone. People displaced from the hills around came to Kitchanga.
Today, I am joyful that many people have come from nearby hills to settle in Kitchanga,
which is now a cosmopolitan town. All of us, we can take Kitchanga as a place of reconcilia-
tion, a place of change where everybody can live in peace.81
These are the words of Laurent Nkunda, speaking to the population of Kitchanga in 2006,
not long after he had founded the CNDP rebel movement. These words clearly reﬂect the
entanglement of Kitchanga’s growth with histories of displacement and its status as a place
of refuge. The reference to a ‘cosmopolitan town’ refers to the demographic ‘diversity’ and
urban characteristics of Kitchanga in relation to its rural surroundings.
In 2003, after several peace agreements, peace had ostensibly come to the Congo.
Unfortunately, it did not last long, as many former rebels felt disgruntled by the peace
settlement. One of them was Nkunda, a dissident Tutsi general linked to the former
RCD government. He launched a new rebel movement in 2005, under the guise of the
need for protection of the Tutsi community.
Not long after his return to the political and military stage, Nkunda relocated to Kitch-
anga where he had been a teacher in the beginning of the 1990s.82 Defections from the
Congolese army FARDC (Forces Armées Republique Democratique du Congo) followed,
and many of these defectors directed themselves to Kitchanga.83 CNDP extended its influ-
ence over certain parts of the North Kivu province and especially in Masisi and Rutshuru.
The rise of the CNDP sparked the emergence of other armed groups in the region.
It seems that it was only in 2006 that Nkunda’s base in Kitchanga became more perma-
nent and turned into one of the CNDP capitals in Masisi. Being a rebel stronghold
reinforced the political importance of Kitchanga. Apart from its geographical location
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at the connection of three different territories (Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale), there are
probably several other reasons why Kitchanga was chosen as Nkunda’s stronghold. As
with CNDP’s other bases (Kilolirwe and Mushaki), Kitchanga had a large concentration
of Congolese Tutsi returnees; their return was one of the CNDP’s key action points.84
CNDP also controlled large swathes of land in and around Kitchanga (sometimes acquired
during the RCD era), and land grabbing continued.
These dynamics of ‘rebel-led’ urbanization of Kitchanga resonate with what Jansen
describes as ‘rebelization’ of the city-camp; yet, they mean something different in this
context. Whereas ‘rebelization’ refers to the role of violence and (former) rebel affiliation
in everyday processes of place-making within the camp-city, Kitchanga’s development
under CNDP’s control reveals the political and military mechanisms behind its permanent
urbanization in broader strategies of violent conflict and military struggle over territorial
control.
CNDP’s official integration into the Congolese army in 2009 after Nkunda was arrested
did not end the movement’s control over the area. From within the FARDC, CNDP kept a
separate command structure and remained in control. During this period, Kitchanga
became referred to as a ‘state within a state’, run under the CNDP flag by a parallel admin-
istration. The police force in Kitchanga was administered by CNDP and taxes were gath-
ered to the benefit of the CNDP instead of the provincial government.85
With its large demographic concentration, Kitchanga presented a steady tax base for
CNDP as well as a pool of labour. Taxes on livestock, road transport, commercial activi-
ties, markets and house rent were amongst CNDP’s urban revenue sources.86 According to
local sources, commercial activities were blooming under CNDP administration.87 Even
after the official integration of CNDP into the army, FARDC regiments consisting of
former CNDP soldiers continued taxation mechanisms on the population and on road
traffic, and force was used to obtain labour for the exploitation of timber and charcoal
in the National Park.88
In the wake of the emergence of the CNDP, clashes between the Congolese army,
Nkunda’s CNDP, and local armed groups such as the APCLS (Alliance des Patriotes
pour un Congo Libre et Souverain) had once again destabilized North Kivu. Almost all
armed groups active during this period cited CNDP as the reason for their (renewed)
mobilization.89 APCLS, founded in 2008 and dominated by Hunde, is but one example
of such a group. As with many of these other groups, it mobilizes against the return of
Tutsi refugees and around access to land for the Hunde-community, even though oppor-
tunism often trumps ideology.90 Violence peaked between October 2007 and November
2008 leading again to large waves of displacement in Masisi and Rutshuru. The IDP
camps around Kitchanga are a remnant of this period. The presence and influence of
armed groups increasingly militarized existing ethnic tensions and rendered them more
violent.
M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) emerged in 2012 as a follow-up of CNDP, led by
General Bosco Ntaganda and part of the former CNDP elite. Even after FARDC had nom-
inally taken control of Kitchanga, M23 (and former CNDP) proxies still managed to exert
some control over the agglomeration. In February 2013, this led to one of the most violent
episodes of Kitchanga’s history, when members of APCLS clashed with the 812th Brigade
of the Congolese army. The commander of this Brigade, colonel Mudahunga, was a Con-
golese Tutsi and former CNDP commander who remained rather close to Bosco
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Ntaganda, former leader of M23. Allegedly, Mudahunga was trying to establish Kitchanga
as a rear base for M23 in the region.
In January 2013, 300 men of APCLS were sent to Kitchanga in an attempt to integrate
them into the army but without any real measures to accompany this integration.91 These
ex-APCLS used their presence in Kitchanga to arrest people whom they suspected having
links with M23, but Mudahunga tried to stop them from interfering. Mudahungu accused
the Hunde population in Kitchanga of supporting the demobilized APCLS, whilst there
were suspicions that he himself was arming youngsters in the Kahe IDP camp.
After APCLS soldiers entered Kahe IDP camp and burnt huts on 26 February 2013, the
simmering tension deteriorated into full-blown conflict. On 27 February 2013, APCLS
from outside Kitchanga started advancing towards the agglomeration and attacked Muda-
hunga’s 812th regiment. Ostensibly to stop their advance, Mudahunga fired mortar
rounds into Kitchanga, landing on civilian areas.
During this fierce fighting over Kitchanga, 146 people died (most of them Hunde), 518
houses were burned and many businesses were looted and destroyed.92 These events again
demonstrate the sometimes violent ways in which spatial settings of forced displacement
can be used as a source of mobilization by different actors. As will be demonstrated in the
remainder of this paper, Kitchanga’s strategic position in regional (ethnic) struggles does
not only emerge from the politics of refuge and forced displacement, but from the politics
of urban expansion as well.
Localité, commune or ville? The politics of urbanization
Kitchanga’s urbanity is the outcome of a complex history of contested mobility and forced
displacement in a political context of violence and militarization. Ethnic tensions and con-
tested claims over the town have sometimes materialized in the urban landscape. For
example, a statute was erected by a Hunde businessman in 2015, symbolizing the
Hunde ‘dominance’ over Kitchanga. The statute depicts the mwami’s mother, Queen
Namulisi, bearing three children on her shoulders. Its meaning is contested. For some,
the three children represent the founders of different branches of the Hunde Bashali chief-
taincies. According to others, they represent the three most important communities in
Kitchanga: Hunde, Hutu and Tutsi.93
In the most recent phase of this complex history, the process of urbanization itself, and
Kitchanga’s administrative status as a ‘city’ have become part of political struggles for
control over the town. In this final phase, the politics of urbanization become most expli-
cit, rendering the concept of an ‘accidental city’ inadequate to analyze the struggle over
Kitchanga’s city status. This political struggle points at the mobilizing potential of
urban identities and socio-political forms of place-making, but also at the mobilizing
potential of urbanization in a context of violent conflict and decentralization.94 In sharp
contrast with Kitchanga’s increasingly urbanized characteristics, the administrative
statute of Kitchanga has not changed accordingly, even though in theory the decentraliza-
tion law would allow for it to be turned into a commune – depending on the answer to the
question if Kitchanga is chef-lieu of the chieftaincy or not.95 There are strong indications
that this is a political decision, interwoven with broader politics of autochthony.
In principle Kitchanga (on theMasisi side) is administratively considered as a conglom-
erate of several villages or hills headed by village chiefs, within the larger administrative
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context of the chieftaincy, which has a distinct legal persona in the 2008 decentralization
law. In practice, these subdivisions are invisible and in Kitchanga people refer to quartiers
[neighborhoods] and chefs de quartiers, using an ‘urban’ vocabulary rather than referring to
villages and village chiefs. Agier has referred to the use of this kind of urban vocabulary as
characteristics of the urbanization process of dynamics place-making in city camps.96 The
official administrative status of Kitchanga is a determining factor in the way it is being gov-
erned, as this status decides who has the authority within any given administrative entity.
For Kitchanga, this means that the customary authorities of the chefferie are those govern-
ing the place, with the Hundemwami as the local supreme authority –who is never elected,
but rather appointed by the customary structures. Themwami is the local representative of
state power, whilst at the same time retaining a considerable amount of autonomy. The
chefferie also has the right to levy taxes and controls land.
If the administrative status of Kitchanga would be transformed into a commune, all this
would drastically change. Given the fact that Hunde are numerically a minority in their
own chefferie (Hutu are the majority) this could possibly shift the power balance in and
over Kitchanga. Moreover, in the absence of ‘customary’ representation for the Rwando-
phone community – and thus often local political authority – in Masisi territory, gaining
political control over certain localities becomes all the more important as it is the only way
to gain official access to forms of local political authority.
Similar challenges can be found in other boomtowns in the Kivu provinces. In Nya-
bibwe (South Kivu) for example, this decentralization agenda and the administrative
shift into a commune was proposed by the provincial government in 2012 but was boy-
cotted by local customary authorities. This caused fierce conflicts between different
scales of power and authority for control over the town.97 In Rubaya (North Kivu) local
Hutu big men strongly lobbied at the Provincial government for a recognition as a
commune, which also resulted in strong tensions amongst local Hutu and Hunde
communities.
As these places occupy strategic nodes in broader dynamics of political and military
control, such local power struggles are easily being brought to a higher level by the invol-
vement of regional and national elites. During discussions over altering the administrative
status of Kitchanga into a commune at the level of the Provincial Parliament in 2010, fierce
resistance was mounted by the Hunde members of the Provincial Parliament.98 The argu-
ment they used was a legal one, namely that Kitchanga is chef lieu of the chieftaincy, and as
such cannot become commune.99 However, depending on the interlocutor, this idea of
Kitchanga as chef lieu is contested. Some inhabitants, mainly those belonging to the Rwan-
dophone community contend that the official chef lieu of the chefferie is in Kiusha, some
kilometres away from Kitchanga.100 Similar resistance was mounted against changing the
administrative status of Mweso, another large agglomeration close by (and not a chef lieu)
into a commune. In addition, several agglomerations far smaller and less urbanized with
few commercial opportunities have been erected into communes, indicating that this
struggle has more to do with who would control these agglomerations rather than with
legal preoccupations.
Thus, the aforementioned demonstration in 2010 demanding Kitchanga’s city status
needs to be seen within this political context, as it took place at the same time the
matter was discussed at the Provincial Parliament. Given the sensible and political
nature of such decisions, it is not surprising that according to some informants, the
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instigators of the march were non-Hunde-politicians, and especially those having links to
CNDP, or the Rwandophone community in general. Rumours about plans to elevate the
agglomeration to a commune were locally framed in Kitchanga as a political ploy to chase
the Hunde from power.101
The decentralization reforms got only half implemented before they were put on hold
by the postponement of the local elections. This created a political vacuum and a general
context of confusion over local authority.102 In the wake of the 2008 decentralization law,
in North Kivu, the Governor officially abolished the ‘postes de territoire’. To fill this
vacuum between local and provincial authorities, the provincial government of North
Kivu appointed Provincial Delegates (Fonctionnaires Délégués), using Kitchanga as a
test case.103
The decision of the Provincial Governor to appoint a Provincial Delegate in Kitchanga
was perceived by the local Hunde community in Kitchanga as a strategy for politicians to
reinforce their control and to interfere with customary matters.104 Although the first Del-
egate was of the Tembo ethnic community (locally considered as ‘autochthonous’), he was
also an ex-RCD official and therefore locally considered by some as being sent to Kitch-
anga to defend the interest of the Rwandophone community. One person saw it as an
extension of the former claims of those associated with the CNDP to change the status
of Kitchanga into a cité, or as an attempt to place Kitchanga under a special regime.105
Others went even a step further, and contended that there were plans at the level of the
provincial government to construct the chefferie offices and the residency of the mwami
elsewhere, so that Kitchanga could in theory obtain the status of a commune.106
These local conflicts and popular perceptions of them, thus have to be understood
within the context of wider conflicts over political authority in Masisi. The political mobil-
ization of the complex ‘autochthony’ issue is reflected in local conflicts down to the lowest
administrative scale. It clearly emerges from the recent political struggles over Kitchanga,
where different ethnic communities claim the town to be ‘theirs’, and ethnicity and auto-
chthony become, as is often the case, the dominant discourses of reference in which this
struggle is framed. The words of this Rwandophone member of the civil society in Kitch-
anga, in 2015, shortly after the first Provincial Delegate was appointed, are telling:
It is we (Hutu and Tutsi) who since long time have asked for a Fonctionnaire Délègue for
Kitchanga who is of another community in order to resolve those problems related to iden-
tity. We think that this resolves the problem, and it is a festivity for us, and I think Kitchanga
is large enough to no longer be administered by the customary authorities. Unfortunately the
Hunde are not happy, and they even wrote a letter to protest against his nomination and in
reaction we have also written a letter in order to support the nomination of the Delegate.107
On 30 January 2017, the Delegate was suspended from his function by the Provincial Gov-
ernor, based on accusations of land grabbing and other forms of ‘acting in disrespect of the
law’.108 This seems to be a conﬁrmation of the activities of land grabbing, illegal taxation,
and exploitation of resources in the Virunga National Park that Kitchanga’s inhabitants,
irrespective of their ethnic community, were accusing him of in 2016.109
Conclusion
Current political tensions over Kitchanga’s administrative recognition as a city can only be
understood by studying its historical trajectory from a village into an urbanized zone of
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refuge. This trajectory has been part of more general dynamics of rural-urban reconfigura-
tions in the context of violent conflict and forced displacement in Eastern Congo. Our
case-study of Kitchanga helps closing the gap in the academic literature on the urban
dimensions of forced displacement and migration in Eastern Congo. Whereas urban
forms of ‘refuge’ have been studied in Kivu’s large cities such as Goma and Bukavu,
smaller urban agglomerations developing from historical patterns of forced mobility
have been largely neglected. Not much is known about the urbanities emerging from
‘camp-cities’ such as Kitchanga.
One thing that we have learned from Kitchanga’s case is that in a political context of
violence and militarization, this urbanity is highly conflictual. Local power struggles for
political control and economic gain have been intensified by the involvement of armed
groups and political elites. Furthermore, Kitchanga’s case shows that the notion of an
‘accidental city’ can be misleading while studying the urbanization process of sites of
forced displacement and refuge, as it may hide the political character of its expansion
and its development into a permanent urban agglomeration. The pull factors attracting
people to Kitchanga, the protracted presence and permanent settlement of IDPs, the devel-
opment of its markets, its position as a rebel headquarter were influenced by political
mechanisms. The strategic position Kitchanga has held for RCD, CNDP, and even
APCLS, is one example of the political importance of the town and the political character
of its expansion. Kitchanga’s historical trajectory raises the question if emerging boom-
towns in the Kivu-provinces developing from concentration of refugees and IDPs
should be conceptualized as cities that were ‘never meant to be’. While recognizing the
tremendous contributions Jansen’s work on ‘accidental cities’ has made to the debate
on the urbanization of refuge, this article shows that the political dimensions of this urban-
ization process should be more closely scrutinized.
This study has offered an original spatial starting point to study the politics of refuge,
mobility, presence, and return in North Kivu. It has underlined the importance of urban
centres as spatial nodes in more regional political geographies of migration and forced dis-
placement. By further investigating the urbanization of camp-cities in war-torn regions
like North Kivu, we can add an important spatial and historical component to the political
analysis of conflict dynamics. Through this approach, rural-urban transformations appear
not only as the outcome of, but as a mechanism in itself of politics of refuge, violent con-
flict, and forced displacement.
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